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Abstract— This study is mainly about  the discrete logarithm problem in the ElGamal cryptosystem over the abelian group U(n) 
where n  is one of the following forms pm, or 2pm  where p is an odd large prime and m is a positive integer. It is  another good way to 
deal  with the ElGamal Cryptosystem using that  abelian group  U(n)={x: x is a positive integer such that x<n and gcd(n,x)=1}  in the 
setting of the discrete logarithm problem . Since I show in this paper that this new study maintains equivalent ( or better) security 
with the original ElGamal cryptosystem( invented by Taher ElGamal in 1985)[1], that works over the finite cyclic group of the finite 
field. It gives a better security because theoretically ElGamal Cryptosystem with U(pm) or with U(2pm) is much more secure since the 
possible solutions for the discrete logarithm will be increased , and that would make this cryptosystem is hard to broken even with 
thousands of years.     
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I. Introduction 
 
 The Classical ElGamal cryptosystem  works over the finite cyclic group of the finite field , and it's one of  the most popular and 
widely used cryptosystems. It's described in the setting of the multiplicative cyclic group  Z*p where p is a large  prime the field  
Zp [2].  In this paper I modify the ElGamal Cryptosystem by using the abelian multiplicative group U(n) modulo a large integer 
n(where n  is one of the following forms pm, or 2pm  for a positive integer m and  p is an odd  large prime) instead of Z*p and get 
equivalent results. However it's proven that U(n) is a group[1] , I will use my own words to prove that for every n >1 , U(n) is 
an abelian group under the multiplication and use the proven theorem that  U(n) is a cyclic group where n  is one of the 
following forms pm, or 2pm   for a positive integer m and  p is an odd  prime in this new study of this paper. Then I construct the 
public and private keys using the new setting of the  discrete logarithm problem , the encryption and decryption procedure  of 
the ElGamal cryptosystem using U(n), and finally illustrate example to show the procedure of the ElGamal cryptosystem using 
U(n). (Where  n  is one of the following forms pm, or 2pm   for a positive integer m and  p is an odd  large prime) .                       
 
 
A-Theorem : For every n>1 , prove that the set U(n)={x : x is a positive integer such that x<n and gcd(n,x)=1} is an abelian 
group under the multiplication modulo n.  
Proof:First of all, let's show that the multiplication mod n is a binary operation on U(n), i.e for all a and b in U(n), a*b is  in 
U(n). Assume for a contradiction that a*b is not  in U(n). suppose that gcd(a*b, n)=q where the integer q>1, then q\a*b and 
q\n.[6]  
Therefore, (q\a or q\b) and q\n.  
If q\a and q\n, then gcd(a,n)≠1 , and similarly if q\b and q\n, then gcd(b,n)≠1. That would contradicts that a and b are in U(n). 
Hence, a*b is in U(n). 
To show that U(n) is a group, 
-Associativity :Since the multiplication modulo n is associative, I'll assume that U(n) is associative . 
-Identity : The identity element for the multiplication modulo n is 1 , and 1 is an element in U(n). 
-Inverses : Suppose that a is in U(n), then gcd(n,a)=1. Therefore, there exists two integers w and v such that , aw+nv=1 . So, 
(aw+nv) mod n≡ 1 which leads to a*w mod n ≡1, then w is the inverse of a . 
BUT it is important to show that w is in U(n). Since wa+nv=1, then gcd(w,n)=1. Hence,  w is in U(n).  
Therefore, U(m) is a group under the multiplication modulo m>1[3] . 
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Note that, the multiplication is commutative , so U(m)  is an abelian group under the multiplication. 
 
 
B-Theorem[8] : The group U(n) is cyclic if and only if n is of one of the following forms : 2, 4, pm, 2pm    where  m is a positive 
integer and p is an odd prime. 
 
C-Discrete Logarithm Problem over the abelian group ( U(n) : n= pm,or 2pm  )  
     If G is  the finite  abelian group U(n) (under the multiplication) and g is a generator of U(n) since U(n) is a cyclic group[4 ], 
then every element h in U(n) can be written as gx for some integer x. The discrete logarithm to the base g of h in the group U(n) 
is defined to be x . 
 
1- Example: To illustrate discrete logarithm problem by a simple example, let n=p1=17, then U(17) is a cyclic( abelian) group 
generated by 3. So for any integer x ,  3x (mod 17) belongs  to U(17)={1,2,….,16}. If x=4 is chosen, then 34 mod 17≡ 13. But 
reversing the previous problem such that  3y ≡ 13 (mod 17), then finding integer  y is the discrete logarithm problem. 
Therefore, the discrete logarithm problem is a one way function that is easy to perform but hard to reverse. I.e, for U(17)=<3>. 
We see that, 
 
 
—                                                     
   
                                      
      
 
2-Remark [5]:  In order to make  n as a safe prime (large) number when it’s using  U(n) as the basis of discrete logarithm based 
cryptosystems, n  should be chosen such that  n is of the forms pm,or 2pm   where m is positive and p is a very large prime 
number (usually at least 1024 –bit). 
 
 
D-The ElGamal Cryptosystem over( U(n): where n= pm,or 2pm  ) 
  
1- Generating a public-key and private key of the EGamal Cryptosystem over ( U(n): where n= pm,or 2pm   ):- 
{ 
-Select a large prime p.                                                                                                                                                                       
– Select a group G=U(n) such that n= pm, or n=  2pm. 
-Select a random integer a to be a member of the group G=U(n) under the multiplication such that 1< a ≤n-2. 
-Select r1 to be  a generator of U(n). 
-Call  r2 ≡( r1) a (mod n). [6] 
-Let the public-key→(r1, r2, n)//(To be announced publicly). [6]-Let the private key →(a) // (To be kept secret ). [6]  
} 
 
 
2-The ElGamal Encryption: (r1, r2, n, Pi). // Pi: the plaintext :[7] 
{ 
-Converting or translating the letters in the Plaintext into their numerical equivalents by using the table below (table 1) as 
example if the plaintext has just letters. 
-Then for i=1,2,….,N, form blocks (Pi)of the largest possible size (with even number of digits).  
-For each Pi,  select a random integer ki  with , 1≤ ki  ≤n-2 (k could be the same for all the blocks). 
- C1,i ≡r1ki (mod n). 
-C2,i ≡ (Pi*r2ki) (mod n)  .   
34 (mod 17)       13              
13 
 
3(mod 17)       
 
? 
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-The cipher corresponding to the plaintext block Pi is the ordered pair E(Pi)=(C1,i,C2,i). 
-Return C1,i and C2,i. // C1,i and C2,i :The cipher-texts  
}   
 
3-The ElGamal Decryption:(a,n, C1,i,C2,i).[6] 
{ 
-Pi≡ [C2,i(C1,ia)-1] (mod p) for all i=1,2,…..,N 
-Return Pi.- 
  } 
Note that:  
* C1,i ≡r1ki (mod n). 
* C2,i ≡ (Pi*r2ki) (mod n) . 
* r2≡r1a (mod n) . 
 
4-Note: To summarize The ElGamal Cryptosystem Procedure over( U(n) : n= pm,or 2pm   ) see figure 1 below . 
 
5-Example: Let's consider a simple example to show how The ElGamal cryptosystem works over U(n) where  n= pm, or 
2pm   ,for  an integer  m≥1,                         
 Suppose that “Sarah “ wants to send a message“ I like math “  to “Niwar” whose Public-key is (r1, r2, n=p1) =(3, 23, 29) and 
whose private key a=4. (Note that r1=3 is a generator of U(29)). 
 
5.1- What Sarah has to do to encrypt that message to be sent to Niwar is the following: 
1.1) Translate the message to its numerical equivalents(by using the table above), then group it to blocks with even number of 
digits (Will use two digits). 
Therefore, the message : “I like math” becomes. 
Plaintext , Pi: “ 08 11 08 10 04 12 00 19 07 “ 
1.2)Select a random integer 1≤ ki≤ n-2 (Choose ki=5)  for all i=1,…..,8. 
1.3) Use Niwar's Public-key , (r1, r2, n) =(3, 23, 29) with k=5 to encrypt each Plain-text block P in a cipher-text using the 
relationship : E(Pi)=( C1,i, C2,i) such that C1,i ≡(r1)k (mod n) and C2,i ≡Pi*(r2)k (mod n) which as the following :- 
C1,i ≡(r1)k (mod n)≡ 35 (mod 29)=11.  
Then for all i, compute C2,i for each block Pi as in table 2 below. 
 
5.2- What Niwar has to do when he gets the following Ciphertext Message : 
E(Pi)=(C1,i,C2,i)= (11,26) (11,14) (11,26) (11,18) (11,13) (11,10) (11,0) (11,11) (11,1) . Then he wants to decrypt it, as the 
following: 
2.1)Use his prime number n=p=29 and his private key a= 4, and the Plaintext formula : Pi ≡(C2,i)((C1,i)a)-1(mod 29) to decrypt 
each (C1,i,C2,i)  for all i=1,…..,9. (see table 3 below ).Therefore the plaintext in the numerical equivalents form is , 
                                      Pi: “ 08 11 08 10 04 12 00 19 07 “ 
2.2)Then by translating this back to letters, we obtain the right message back, 
  
                                                                                "I L I K E Math ". 
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E-Figures and Tables: 
 
 
                                    Encryption                                                                                           Decryption 
 
                                                                              (   Figure 01) 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 A simple graph to show the procedure of  ElGamal Cryptosystem over U(n). 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Letters Numerical equivalents 
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TABEL 02 
Computing C2,i for each block Pi in Example 1. 
The 
Plaintext Pi: 
C2,i ≡Pi*(r2)k (mod n) ≡ Pi * 235 (mod 29) ≡ Pi  * 25 (mod 29) Ciphertext:   
E(Pi)=(C1,i,C2,i) 
P1: 08   C2,1≡ 08*25 (mod 29)= 26  (11,26) 
P2:  11 C2,2 ≡ 11*25 (mod 29) = 14 (11,14) 
P3: 08 C2,3 ≡ 08*25 (mod 29) = 26 (11,26) 
P4: 10 C2,4 ≡10*25 (mod 29) = 18 (11,18) 
P5: 04 C2,5 ≡04*25 (mod 29) = 13 (11,13) 
P6: 12 C2,6 ≡12*25 (mod 29) =10 (11,10) 
P7 :00 C2,7 ≡00*25 (mod 29) =0 (11,0) 
P8: 19 C2,8 ≡19*25 (mod 29) =11 (11,11) 
P9: 07 C2,9 ≡07*25 (mod 29) =1 (11,1) 
 
 
 
TABEL 03 
Computing Pi for each C2,i in Example 1 
 
CIPHERTEXT:   
E(PI)=(C1,I,C2,I) 
PLAINTEXT : 
PI ≡( C2,I)(( C1,I)A)-1 (MOD P) ≡( C2,I)((11)4)-1 (MOD 29)≡( C2,I)(7) (MOD 29) 
(C1,1,C2,1)=(11,26) P1 ≡26*7 (MOD 29)=08 
(C1,2,C2,2)=(11,14) P2 ≡ 14*7 (MOD 29)=11 
(C1,3,C2,3) =(11,26) P3 ≡ 26*7 (MOD 29)=08 
(C1,4,C2,4) =(11,18) P4≡18*7 (MOD 29)=10 
(C1,5,C2,5)=(11,13) P5≡13*7 (MOD 29)=04 
(C1,6,C2,6)=(11,10) P6 ≡10*7 (MOD 29)=12 
(C1,7,C2,7)=(11,0)   P7 ≡0*7 (MOD 29)=00 
(C1,8,C2,8)=(11,11) P8 ≡11*7 (MOD 29)=19 
(C1,9,C2,9)=(11,01) P9 ≡01*7 (MOD 29)=07 
 
                  International Journal of Mathematics Trends and Technology – Volume 7  Number 3 – March 2014 
ISSN: 2231-5373                         http://www.ijmttjournal.org Page 189 
 
II. CONCLUSION 
 
       From the modification of discrete logarithm problem based cryptosystem , it is clear to see that the discrete logarithm 
problem based cryptosystem (especially over ElGamal Cryptosystem ) works easily over  another type of  the groups (other than 
the finite cyclic group  ) which is the abelian group U(n) where  n= pm,or 2pm  ,for   an integer  m≥1.  And this new study might 
maintain equivalent (or better) security with the original ElGamal cryptosystem over Z*p because in the original ElGamal 
cryptosystem, U(n=p1) was used and given a really strong security as Taher ElGamal claimed and proved. But in this new study 
I modify the ElGamal cryptosystem using  n= pm, or n= 2pm   ,for   an integer  m≥1.  And it absolutely gives a better security if 
we apply and test it because finding the private key depends on finding all the possible solutions for the discrete logarithm 
problem, which is impossible over bigger groups like U(n) where n= pm, or n= 2pm   ,for   an integer  m≥1 .                           
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